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Conditional Zoning in Illinois:
Beast or Beauty?
CHARLES L. SIEMON
INTRODUCTION

Few subjects in Illinois zoning have engendered as much confusion and
conflict as has the concept of conditional zoning. That is so even though
it is clear that conditional zoning is lawful under Illinois law-"conditional
zoning is not per se invalid."' And while it is evident (or should be
evident) that conditional zoning is a flexible tool which .allows local
government to tailor the application of zoning to the particular circumstances
of a particular parcel of land in a particular context, the concept has been
viewed with skepticism by local governments and the courts alike. A
careful review of the history and evolution of zoning and the case law
governing conditional zoning in Illinois reveals that judicial and local
government antipathy towards conditional zoning is based on historical
anomalies which have, or should have, little or no modern vitality.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLANNING AND ZONING
To understand the law governing conditional zoning in Illinois and why
local governments are reticent to embrace conditional zoning, a brief review
of the history of planning and zoning is necessary.
Prior to the turn of the century, local land use controls were limited in
nature and generally related to fire and building standards, and in some
cases, to restrictions on the location of noxious uses like livery stables, brick
yards, and slaughter houses. , Around. the turn of the century, interest in
generally regulating the use of land began to expand, and by 1920 local
governments were enacting ordinances which, "zoned" out any use perceived
to be undesirable.3

* A.B., Emory University; J.D., Florida State University; Partner, Siemon, Larsen

& Marsh, Boca Raton, FL.
1. Goffinet v. Christian County, 357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 1976).
2. See e.g., Dainese v. Cooke, 91 U.S. 580 (1875); City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 7
N.Y.S. 501 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1889).
3. See generally Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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[U]rban America was in something of a crisis in the early
1920's. Like a patient who could endure his fever until he
suddenly learned that there was now a new remedy for it
and who was then impatient to be cured, urban America
was now sure that it would perish if it did not have zoning ....
Zoning was the heaven-sent nostrum for sick
cities, the wonder drug of the planners, the balm sought
by lending institutions and householders alike. City after
city worked itself into a state of acute apprehension until
it could adopt a zoning ordinance.4
Early zoning ordinances were based on the concept of the segregation
and separation of uses. A city was divided into a number of discrete
districts, usually one or more exclusively residential or non-residential
districts. Often, the districts were cumulative in that all uses permitted in
low intensity, exclusive districts were permitted in less exclusive, more
intense districts. Judicial perspectives of zoning during the late 1910s and
early 1920s ranged from outright rejection to practically religious embrace.
The Texas Supreme Court, for example, rejected the notion of use
segregation as a valid exercise of the police power:
The ordinance is clearly not a regulation for the protection
of the public health or public safety. It is idle to talk
about the lawful business of an ordinary retail store
threatening the public health or endangering the public
safety. It is equally idle in our opinion to speak of its
-impairing the public comfort: or as being injurious to the
public welfare of a community.5
4. Scott, American City Planning Since 1890 (Chicago 1969).
Nothing appeared so destructive of urban order as garages and machine
shops in residential areas, or loft buildings in exclusive shopping districts,
or breweries amid small stores and light manufacturing establishments.
Nothing caused an investor so much anguish as the sight of a grocery store
being erected next door to a single-family residence on which he had lent
money. Nothing made whole neighborhoods feel so outraged and helpless
as the construction of apartment houses when private deed restrictions
expired and there was no zoning to prevent vacant lots from being used for
multi-family structures. id.
5. See Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 516 (Tex. 1921).
Under the welfare provision of the statute, a city may exercise broad police
power in protecting the public health, safety and comfort, but to prohibit
an owner of property from using it for ordinary business purposes, or for
any use not in itself a nuisance, where there is no express legislative
authority, is not within municipal power.
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Other courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court, were more
receptive. Indeed, in contrast to its later reputation as a "prodevelopment state," the Illinois Supreme Court was unabashedly
pro-zoning. In City of Aurora v. Bums, the court literally extolled
the virtues of zoning:
The authority of the States to enact such laws as they
deem reasonably necessary to promote the public health,
morals, safety, and general welfare comprehends a wide
range of judgment and discretion in determining the
matters which are of sufficiently general importance to be
subjected to State regulation and administration. Nor do
the limitations of the federal Constitution deny to a state
the power to establish all regulations reasonably necessary
to advance and secure the health, morals, safety, and
general welfare of the community.'
And while the court recognized that the police power was not without
constraints, the court's deference to legislative perspectives is apparent:
The police power, however, has constitutional limits,
and any measure enacted or adopted in its exercise, to be
sustained, must bear some reasonable relation to the
purposes for which the power may be exercised. The
Legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private rights.
The legislative determination as to what is a proper
exercise of the police power is not conclusive, but is
subject to review by the courts. If the means employed
have no real, substantial relation to public objects within
the state's power, or if those means are arbitrary and
unreasonable, the judiciary will disregard mere forms and
interfere for the protection of rights injuriously affected by
such illegal action.'
Remarkably, the court went on:
The constantly increasing density of our urban
populations, the multiplying forms of industry, and the

Julian v.
6.
7.
8.

Golden Rule Oil Co., 212 P. 884, 885 (Kan. 1923).
149 N.E. 784 (Ill. 1925).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 787-88.
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growing complexity of our civilization, make it necessary
for the state, either directly or through some public
agency by its sanction, to limit individual activities to a
greater extent than formerly. With the growth and
development of the state the police power necessarily
develops, within reasonable bounds, to meet the changing
conditions. The power is not circumscribed by precedents
arising out of past conditions, but is elastic and capable of
expansion in order to keep pace with human progress...
"It may be said in a general way that the police power
extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth
in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the public
welfare."9
According to the court:
The State imposes restraints upon individual conduct.
Likewise its interests justify restraints upon the uses to
which private property may be devoted. By the protection
of individual rights the state is not deprived of the power
to protect itself or to promote the general welfare. Uses
of private property detrimental to the community's welfare
may be regulated or even prohibited. The harmless may
sometimes be brought within the regulation or prohibition
in order to abate or destroy the harmful. The segregation
of industries, commercial pursuits, and dwellings to
particular districts in a city, when exercised reasonably,
may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safety,
and general welfare of the community. The establishment
of such districts or zones may, among other things,
prevent congestion of population, secure quiet residence
districts, expedite local transportation, and facilitate the
suppression of disorder, the extinguishment of fires, and
the enforcement of traffic and sanitary regulations. The
danger of fire and the risk of contagion are often lessened
by the exclusion of stores and factories from areas
devoted to residences, and, in consequence, the safety and
health of the community may be promoted. These

9. Id. at 788 (quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911)).
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objects, among others, are attained by the exercise of the
10
police power.
And then in the court's grand finale it stated:
Zoning necessarily involves a consideration of the
community as a whole and a comprehensive view of its
needs. An arbitrary creation of districts, without regard to
existing conditions or future growth and development, is
not a proper exercise of the police power and is not
sustainable. No general zoning plan, however, can be
inaugurated without incurring complaints of hardship in
particular instances. But the individual whose use of his

property may be restricted is not the only person to be
considered. The great majority, whose enjoyment of their
property rights requires the imposition of restrictions upon
the uses to which private property may be put, must also
be taken into consideration. The exclusion of places of
business from residential districts is not a declaration that
such places are nuisances, or that they are to be suppressed as such, but it is a part of the general plan by
which the city's territory is allotted to different uses in
order to prevent, or at least to reduce, the congestion,
disorder, and dangers which often inhere in unregulated
municipal development."

10. City of Aurora v. Bums, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (II1.1925). The court cited with favor
a host of pro-zoning decisions from around the country: In re Opinion of the Justices, 127
N.E. 784, 788 (Mass. 1920); Building Inspector of Lowell v. Stoklosa, 145 N.E. 262 (Mass.
1924); Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 145 N.E. 265 (Mass. 1924); Brett v. Building
Comm'r of Brookline, 145 N.E. 269 (Mass. 1924); Bamel v. Building Comm'r, 145 N.E. 272
(Mass. 1924); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920); In re
Cherry, 193 N.Y.S. 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); State ex reL Carter v. Harper Bldg. Comm'r,
196 N.W. 451 (Wis. 1923); Holzbauer v. Ritter, 198 N.W. 852 (Wis. 1924); Ware v. City
of Wichita, 214 P. 99 (Kan. 1923); West v. City of Wichita, 234 P. 978 (Kan. 1925); City
of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N.W. 823 (Iowa 1921); State ex rel. Cirello v. City
of New Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 234
P. 381 (Cal. 1925); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works of Los Angeles, 234 P. 388 (Cal. 1925);
Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 192 P. 716 (Cal. 1920); State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton
Inspector of Bldgs., 204 N.W. 569 (Minn. 1925); Pritz v. Messer, 149 N.E. 30 (Ohio 1925);
Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry & Stove Repair Works, 187 P. 829 (Utah 1920);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
11. Bums, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (Ill. 1925).
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In 1926, the United States Supreme Court resolved the split among the
states when the Court decided the landmark case of Village of Euclid, Ohio
v. Ambler Realty Co., an opinion that validated the general concept of
zoning and established the scope of judicial review for local land use
regulations which endures to this day. In Euclid, a property owner successfully challenged a zoning ordinance at the district court level on the grounds
that the ordinance violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.13 From the
landowner's perspective, the issue was not the authority of the village to
regulate 4the use of land, but the inherent "arbitrariness" of the regulations
at issue:'
We believe it, however, to be the law that these powers
must be reasonably exercised, and that a municipality may
not, under the guise of the police power, arbitrarily divert
property from its appropriate and most economical uses,
or diminish its value, by imposing restrictions which have
no other basis than the momentary taste of public authorities. Nor can police regulations be used to effect the
arbitrary desire to have a municipality resist the operation
of economic laws and remain rural, exclusive and aesthetic, when its land is needed to be otherwise developed by
that larger public good and public welfare, which takes
into consideration the extent to which the prosperity of the
country depends upon the economic development of its
business and industrial enterprises. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding inter alia, that:

12. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. Id. at 384.
14. Id. Indeed, counsel for the landowner argued:
That municipalities have power to regulate the height of buildings, area of
construction, and density of use, in the interest of the public safety, health,
morals, and welfare, are propositions long since established; that a rational
use of this power may be made by dividing a municipality into districts or
zones, and varying the requirements according to the characteristics of the
districts, is, of course, equally established.
Id. at 373.
15. Id. at 373-74.
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[I]f the validity of the legislative classification for zoning
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control.... 6
We have nothing to do with the question of the wisdom
or good policy of municipal ordinances. If they are not
satisfying to a majority of the citizens, their recourse is to
7
the ballot-not the courts.1
In other words, the Supreme Court held that a zoning regulation is
valid if a municipality can come up with any "substantial" justification, even
after the fact, that is "sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it
must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
8
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'
But while zoning was all the rage and practically immune from judicial
intervention, planning, the logical and legal predicate for zoning, was all but
ignored, notwithstanding the fact that the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act,' 9 ultimately adopted in whole or in part by forty-four states, provided
that zoning "shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan." 20
Nowhere in Euclid did the Court mention the concept of planning, even
though the backers of zoning were ardent planning advocates: "I am a firm
believer in city planning as a means of eliminating waste, raising living
standards, and achieving higher standards of community life. Good city
planning is one of the first obligations which we owe to the future as part
payment of our debts to past generations. ,21

16. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
17. Id. at 393.
18. Id. at 395.
19. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926).
20. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was prepared by an advisory committee
composed of distinguished planning professionals, including Alfred Bettman, Edward Bassett,
and Frederick Law Olmsted, and was published by the Department of Commerce in 1926.
Under the welfare provisions of the statute, a city may exercise broad
police power in protecting the public health, safety and comfort; but to
prohibit an owner of property from using it for ordinary business purposes,
or for any use not in itself a nuisance, where there is no express legislative
authority, is not within municipal power.
Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 212 P. 884, 885 (Kan. 1923).
21. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In 1924, Herbert Hoover appointed the Commission
which prepared the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act.
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During the thirty years after Euclid, zoning law slumbered along with
little change. During this period, the courts invented all manner of fictions
to deal with the comprehensive plan mandate of the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act.22 One of the most elaborate of these fictions was the
concept of "spot zoning,"' 23 one of those rules that describes a situation
'
everyone is familiar with but no one can describe "until they see it."
Ostensibly, spot zoning was the antithesis of "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan," that is, discriminatory treatment that is not based on
the goals, policies and objectives of an adopted comprehensive plan.
Court after court continued to stand themselves on their heads in order
to avoid the idea that the discipline of planning and an officially adopted
and implemented comprehensive plan are a logical predicate to land use
regulations:
While the enabling statute requires that zoning regulations
be in accordance with a comprehensive plan, it does not
specifically delineate what is required. It would appear
that neither a "master plan" nor even a written plan is
necessary. In our view, the requirements of the enabling
legislation are met if implicit in the ordinance there is the
element of planning which is both rational and consistent
with the basic land use policies of the community. The
instant record demonstrates that there was some planning
prior to the adoption of the ordinance. It is significant
that the Town is inhabitated by some 500 to 1000 people
and is rural and rustic in character. These factors, among
others, were considered by the Planning Board. Conse22. "The enabling act calls for a comprehensive plan, but we think that such a
requirement is met, if due consideration is given to the common needs of a particular
district." County Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 46 A.2d 684, 688 (Md. App.
1946).
23. 3 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§§ 28.01-2802 (4th ed. 1975, Supp. 1994).
The term "spot zoning" refers to the rezoning of a small parcel of land to
permit a use which fails to comply with a comprehensive plan or is
inconsistent with the surrounding area, grants a discriminatory benefit to
the parcel owner, and/or harms neighboring properties or the community
welfare.... Zoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan promotes
the public welfare by providing for an orderly and integrated development
process. By definition, therefore, spot zoning is "the antithesis of planned
zoning."
Id.
24. Id.
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quently, there was, in our opinion, a sufficient showing of
a comprehensive plan.25
As will be shown, the absence of a planning predicate for zoning
created a judicial environment which was unreceptive to flexible concepts
like conditional zoning.
Ultimately, the need for a planning predicate for zoning began to be
recognized in the late 1960s. At first, recognition of planning and an
officially adopted comprehensive plan as a predicate to land use regulation
was mainly the province of the legislatures, as a number of states took the
lead and adopted mandatory planning acts.26 California, Oregon, Idaho,
New Jersey, and Florida were among the states that revised their enabling
legislation to make it clear that planning was an essential ingredient in the
zoning equation. 27
(1)(a) After a comprehensive plan, or element thereof, has
been adopted in conformity with this act, all development
undertaken by, and all actions taken in regard to development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to land
covered by such plan or element shall be consistent with
such plan or element as adopted.28
And, to a limited extent the courts finally got the message about the
relationship between zoning and planning: "The enactment of a comprehensive plan is a precondition to the validity of zoning ordinances. It follows
a fortiori that an amendment to a zoning ordinance must also be in
accordance with the adopted plan. '29 One court even concluded that the

25. McBride v. Town of Forestburgh, 54 A.D.2d 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). How
the "policies" of the community can be evaluated where they are not memorialized in a plan
is somewhat difficult to conceptualize. It is interesting to note that the court concludes that
"some planning" was enough to support the regulations at issue in McBride and then observes
that the population of the town was somewhere between five hundred and one thousand
persons, a somewhat imprecise characterization of the demographics of the town--"some
planning."
26. See generally FRED BOSSELMAN AND DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
27. See, e.g., West's Ann. Cal. Gov't Code § 65860; West's Fla. Stat. Ann. §
163.3194; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 67-6508, 67-6511 (Supp. 1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. 40:55D-62;
Or. Rev. Stat. 197.010(3). See also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-114.03. It is interesting to note
that the "quiet revolution" did not spread far enough to ensure that the ALI's "A Model Land
Development Code" included a mandatory planning requirement.
28. Fla. Stat. § 163.3194.
29. Love v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bingham County, 671 P.2d 471, 472 (Idaho
1983).
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"essence" of constitutionally valid zoning is demonstrated by the existence
of a comprehensive plan: "The essence of constitutional zoning with no due
process or equal protection problems is generally recognized to be
demonstrated by the existence of a plan which uniformly, without discrimination3 and without unreasonable restrictions, promotes the general wel,
fare.
It can be stated that the relationship between planning and land use
31
regulation has now found general judicial acceptance.
What a governing body charged to zone "in accordance with" . . . [a
comprehensive plan] must do is make a factual inquiry into whether the
requested zoning ordinance or amendment reflects the goals of,and takes
into account thosefactors in, the comprehensive plan in light of the present
factual circumstances surrounding the request.
Bone v. City of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Idaho 1984) (emphasis added).
30. Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn. 1984). But see, Central
Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike, 409 N.E.2d 258, 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979):
[A]ithough the existence of a comprehensive plan makes it more difficult
to attack the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, it is still the general
rule that the challenge to constitutionality must establish that the ordinance
is arbitrary, confiscatory, unreasonable, and not based on the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare.
409 N.E.2d at 280. How one would demonstrate that a contemporary land use restriction is
reasonable and not arbitrary without benefit of a plan is somewhat difficult to perceive,
except to recognize that virtually any justification will do under the "post hoc rationalization"f"anything goes" model. See also, Board of County Comm'rs of San Miguel v. City of
Las Vegas, 622 P.2d 695 (N.M. 1980) (holding an ordinance invalid because it was not in
accordance with a comprehensive plan).
31. Comprehensive Plans are a guide to regulations; zoning ordinances are controlling.
See Barry v. Kitsap County, 613 P.2d 1138 (Wash. 1980); Toaandos Penninsula Assoc. v.
Jefferson County, 648 P.2d 448 (Wash. App. Ct. 1982); West Hill Citizens for Controlled
Dev. Density v. Kind County Counsel, 627 P.2d 1002 (Wash. App. Ct. 1981); Byrd v.
Stringer, 666 P.2d 1332 (Or. 1983); Margolis v. Dist. Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. App. Ct.
1981); Stuart v. Board of County Comm'rs, County of Larimer, 699 P.2d 978 (Colo. App.
Ct. 1985); Smith v. Winhall, 436 A.2d 760 (Vt. 1981); Nicholas, Hein and Kissinger v.
Township of Harris, 375 A.2d 1583 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977); Taco Bell v. City of Mission,
678 P.2d 133 (Kan. 1984); Board of Supervisors of Stafford County v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
American, 310 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1983); Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 256 N.W.2d 686 (Neb.
1977); People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Webster, 501 A.2d 1343 (Md. App. 1986);
App. Ct. 1986);
City Nat'l Bank of Kankakee v. County of Kendall, 489 N.E.2d 486 (Ill.
Stevens v. City of Glendale, 178 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1981); Bryan v. Salmon Corp., 554 S.W.2d
912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
A Comprehensive Plan is not necessarily a written document. See Drake v. Craven,
672 P.2d 1064 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983); Sasick v. City of Omaha, 347 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1984);
Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Town of East Hampton, 442 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1981); Herrington v.
Town of Mexico, 398 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1977); Bernard v. City of Bedford, 593 S.W.2d 809
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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Furthermore, in most states, the discipline of planning has emerged as
an expected predicate for land use regulations.32

We do not find it necessary here to attempt an all-inclusive definition of the required comprehensive plan. What
suffices as such may well vary according to the stage at
which a particular city or county is in its zoning process.
The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for

Zoning ordinances must be in accordance with statewide plans. See MclntureCooper Co. v. Board of Comm'rs of Washington County, 637 P.2d 201 (Or. Ct. App. 1981);
Willamette Univ. v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 608 P.2d 1178 (Co. App. 1980);
South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Comm'rs of Clackamas County, 569
P.2d 1063 (Or. 1977).
See also Stoddard v. Town of Marilla, 400 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977);
Allen v. Flather County, 601 P.2d 399 (Mont. 1979); Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs,
644 P.2d 242 (Colo. 1982); Stoney-Brook Dev. Corp. v. Town of Fremont, 474 A.2d 561
(N.H. 1984); Green v. County Council of Sussex County, 508 A.2d 882 (Del. Ch. 1986);
Singer v. Davenport, 264 S.E.2d 637 (W. Va. 1980); Village of McGrew v. Steidley, 305
N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 1981); Copple v. City of Lincoln, 274 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 1979); Troy
Campus v. City of Troy, 349 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
Zoning regulations must be in accordance with the comprehensive plan. See 1000
Friends of Oregon v. Board of County Comm'rs, Benton County, 575 P.2d 651 (Or. Ct. App.
1978); Taylor v. Incorporated Village of Head of the Harbor, 480 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984); McCarty v. City of Kansas City, 671 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Levite
v. State, 613 P.2d 1259 (Ariz. 1980); Lore v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bingham, 671
P.2d 471 (Idaho 1983); Boro v. City of Lewiston, 893 P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1984); Bell v. City
of Elkhorn, 364 N.W.2d 144 (Wis. 1985); Howard County v. Dorsey, 438 A.2d 1339 (Md.
1982); Montgomery v. Brewer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687 (Idaho 1980).
See also Cardon Investments v. Town of New Market, 466 A.2d 504 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1983); Miaz v. County Comm'rs of Cecil County, 433 A.2d 771 (Md. 1981); Borough
Council of Churchill v. Pagal, 460 A.2d 1214, (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); West v. City of Lake
Charles, 375 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Garelnes B.V. v. City of Greenwood Village,
Colo., 630 F. Supp. 644 (D. Colo. 1986); Mesolella v. City of Providence, 439 A.2d 1370
(R.I. 1982); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n of the Dist. of Columbia, 392
A.2d 1027 (D.C. 1978); Neighborhood Action Group v. Calaveras County, 203 Cal. Rptr.
401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); DeBottari v. Norco City Council, 217 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979); Klem v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of Jackson Township, 387 A.2d 667 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978); East Lands, Inc.
v. Floyd County, 262 S.E.2d 51 (Ga. 1979); Sweetmon v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d
1277 (R.I. 1976); Love v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bingham County, 701 P.2d 1293
(Idaho 1985).
32. Indeed some courts have examined the competency of local planning programs.
See, e.g., Guardians of Turlock's Integrity v. Turlock City Council, 197 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983); Holmgren v. City of Lincoln, 256 N.W.2d 686 (Neb. 1977); and discussion
of First Bank and Trust Co. of Boca Raton v. Town of Palm Beach, cited in BABCOCK,
BILLBOARDS: GLASS HouSES AND THE LAW (1977).
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summary judgment showed, however, that at this late
stage in its zoning process, the City of Raleigh is operating pursuant to a sufficiently comprehensive plan. The
City has in effect a comprehensive set of zoning regulations which cover the entire City. The City's Planning
Department has conducted comprehensive studies of the
parks and
City's housing, transportation, public facilities,
33
recreation, and a wide range of other needs.
Even in Illinois, a state much criticized by Williams and other
commentators for its primitive and pro-developer zoning perspectives,' the
comprehensive plan has gained a measure of, though undefined, respect:
Another significant aspect of the case [a case sustaining
a minimum lot size of 160 acres to protect prime agricultural lands] is the county's adoption of a comprehensive
The adoption of a comprehensive
plan for the area ....
plan which incorporates valid zoning goals increases the
likelihood that the zoning of a particular parcel in conformity therewith is not arbitrary or unrelated to the public
interest. The courts in Illinois have increasingly accorded
importance to the existence of a comprehensive plan in
reviewing zoning cases.35
II. POISONOUS FRUIT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PLANLESS ZONING TREE
In the context of planless zoning, it should not be surprising that the
courts would be skeptical of flexible zoning initiatives like conditional
zoning. Without the framework of the goals, policies, and objectives of a
comprehensive plan, the individual emoluments conferred by conditional
zoning were impossible to judge in regard to traditional zoning issues of
uniformity, consistency and reasonableness. A court would have difficulty
discerning whether a particular grant of entitlement was a reasoned judgment
of community and neighborhood interest or a reward for political support,
or worse still, corruption. In fact, in the absence of policies of general

33. A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 458 (N.C. 1979).

34. See NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., I AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 6.16 (rev.

1988).

35. Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981). See

also City Nat'l Bank v. Kendall County, 489 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Concerned
Citizens for McHenry, Inc. v. City of McHenry, 395 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
Parkway Bank Homeowners Ass'n Co. v. Cook, 309 N.E.2d 763 (II1. App. Ct. 1974).
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application laid down by a comprehensive plan to guide individual decisions
as to whether a particular conditional zoning was valid, the courts were
confronted by an inherently suspect regime. Under the kind of unroutinized
review implicit in the "spot zoning" doctrine, it did not matter whether a
particular conditional zoning resulted in a more beneficial zoning decision. 36 For if the decision singled out a particular parcel of land for specialized treatment, no matter how reasonable, the decision was condemned
by the historical artifacts of zoning tradition.
Although it seems to be popular lore among local governmental
officials in Illinois that conditional zoning is not valid in the State of
Illinois, it is only indisputable that conditional rezonings are not invalid per
se in Illinois. 37 In order to be valid, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
conditions attached to rezonings must be directed at the goals, policies, and
objectives of a local government's comprehensive plan and the public
health, safety, and welfare. a
The conditions set forth in the amendment in the present
case are not of such a nature as to constitute an abrupt
departurefrom the comprehensive zoning plan of Christian County, which emphasizes substantial industrial
development for the future. Such conditions can be
deemed neither a surrender of governmental authority by
the county nor an attempt to improperly control the use of
land.3 9
On the other hand, the case law is equally clear that conditions which
introduce an element of contract "have no place in the legislative
,,40
process ...
The distinction between elements of contract and appropriate conditions
is not readily apparent. Zoning commentators have long criticized the
"distinction without a difference" dichotomy between valid conditional
zoning and invalid contract zoning, and the Illinois case law is as deserving
of criticism as any.4

36. The Hobson's choice confronted by many local governments was not between a
rezoning with conditions and just saying no, but rather the alternative to conditional zoning
was a rezoning with no protective conditions.
37. See Goffinet v. County of Christian, 357 N.E.2d 442 (111.1976).
38. Id. at 447.

39. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).

40. Id.

41. See generally ZIEGLER, supra note 23.

NORTHERN ILLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

Historically, zoning which involved unilateral or agreed upon
conditions (or "contracts") was not favored by Illinois courts. For example,
in the earliest reported opinion which addresses the subject, Treadway v.
City of Rockford,42 the Illinois Supreme Court, in what is truly gratuitous
that conditional zoning amendments were suspect, stating as
dicta, noted
43
follows:
One other point should be mentioned. All parties have
argued as if this were an ordinary amendment rezoning
property from one classification to another within the
framework of the general zoning scheme set forth in the
ordinance. The ordinance in question is not, however, an
unconditional amendment rezoning the property from a
residential to a local business classification. It is conditional upon the owner's entering into a covenant setting
forth in some detail the nature of the improvements to be
erected on the property. Such conditional amendments
have not fared well in the courts of other jurisdictions,
and have frequently been invalidated either because they
introduce an element of contract which has no place in the
legislative process or because they constitute an abrupt
departure from the comprehensive plan contemplated in
zoning. This aspect of the ordinance, however, was not
raised in the trial court and is not properly before us on
this appeal."4
Several years after Treadway, the court in Hedrich v. Village of
Niles,4 5 considered the validity of a rezoning which was conditioned on a
"collateral agreement" and "other incentives" by which the property owner
agreed to sell a portion of the property to the village on favorable terms and

42. 182 N.E.2d 219, 224 (1962).
43. The court did not quote from any Illinois decisions and was apparently content to
offer citations of decisions from Maryland, New Jersey, and Florida. Id.
44. Id. Less there be any question as to whether the Supreme'Court's view of the
rezoning granted by the City of Rockford had anything to do with the court's willingness to
offer dicta, the court made its view clear when Treadway made a second trip to the high
court on the basis of what the court itself on a trial court certification which was insufficient
to confer jurisdiction. On remand, the conditions attached to the rezoning were repealed by
the municipality and the rezoning was once again sustained by the trial court. Those efforts,
however, were to no avail as the Supreme Court overtly substituted its judgment for that of
the lower court and the city. Treadway v. City of Rockford, 192 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. 1963).
45. 250 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
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conditions in return for favorable action on an application for a rezoning. 4
The trial court had refused to consider the issue of so-called contract zoning
because the issue was not raised in the pleadings, but the appellate court
reversed because the issue was "formed" during the trial. 4 In its opinion,
the appellate court noted that "zoning ordinances should not be subject to
bargaining or contract" and subsequently invalidated the rezoning because
the circumstances put zoning officials "in the questionable position of
bartering their legislative discretion for emoluments that had no bearing on
the merits of the requested amendment. '48 A careful reading of Hedrich,
however, suggests that the fatal flaw in the rezoning was not necessarily the
the conditions "had no bearing on
existence of conditions, but the fact that 49
the merits of the requested amendment.
Subsequently, Hedrich was relied upon in Cederberg v. City of
Rockford.5° In Cederberg, a restrictive covenant was recorded "at the
suggestion of the zoning committee, coincidental with, and as a condition
to, passage of the committee's report recommending rezoning."'" The
rezoning limited the use of two lots to offices even though some forty-three
other land uses were permitted in the business district to which the property
was rezoned.52 The rezoning was challenged, and the trial court invalidated the restrictive covenant as "an improper attempt by the City to control the
use of the land. 5 3 Although the trial court's decision on this point was not
contested, the trial court's holding that the business rezoning was nevertheless valid was subject to an appeal.
On appeal, both parties agreed that "the covenant was a type of
'contract zoning"' and, thus, was void.54 Therefore, the question of what
exactly constitutes contract zoning was not before the court. The court,
nevertheless, discussed the validity of the restrictive covenant and the
validity of "contract zoning"55 in the context of addressing whether the
business zoning was valid:

46. Id. at 792.
47. Id. at 793.
48. Id. at 796.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
51. Id. at 250.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 251.
55. Citing to three "classic" contract zoning cases -- one each in New Jersey, Maryland
and Florida-which have long since been discredited. See WILLIAMS, supra note 34.
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Each of these cases [contract and conditional zoning
cases] 56 condemns the practice of regulating zoning
through agreements or contracts between the zoning
authorities and property owners. While no single basis for
the rule against such zoning practices emerges from the
cases cited, among the courts' reasons are that by entering
into agreement with the property owner, the zoning
authority might use the zoning power to further private
interests in violation of public policy; that such rezoning
is a deviation from the basic zoning plan resulting in nonuniform application of the zoning law and inconsistencies
within a zoning classification; that when the actual zoning
requirements in force are determined by reference to
evidence extrinsic to the
zoning ordinances, the zoning
57
law is rendered vague.
The court went on to "agree with the trial judge and the parties to this
appeal that the restrictive covenant was an invalid attempt by the City to
control the use of the land,"58 citing to Hedrich for the proposition that
"zoning ordinances should not be subject to bargaining or contract,"5 9 and
that "[e]vidence is clear that there was an agreement between the City
Council and the prior landowner, by which the local business zoning
classification would be granted if a restrictive covenant was executed,
limiting the business uses permitted on the land.' The cases cited support
the conclusion that, under these circumstances, the restrictive covenant is
void.6 '
The court held that the reasoning of Hedrich applied because "[t]here
is no indication in the record that the rezoning was necessary or that it was
granted only after a consideration of the appropriate use of the land within
the total zoning scheme of the community.'62
As in Hedrich, a careful reading of Cederbergreveals that although the
court speaks in broad and absolute terms, the fatal flaw in the rezoning was
56. None of the cases to which the court referred, Houston Petroleum Co. v.
Automotive Prod. C. Ass'n., 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952), Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d
86 (Fla. 1956) and Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 163, 148 A.2d 429 (Md. Ct. App.
1959), were Illinois cases.
57. Cederberg, 291 N.E.2d at 251.
58. Id.
.59. Id. at 252.
60. Id. at 251.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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the absence of evidence that "the rezoning was necessary or that it was
granted only after a consideration of the appropriate use of the land within
the total zoning scheme of the community."6' 3 Moreover, the discussion of
conditional and contract zoning is dicta.
In 1973, "contract zoning" was once again addressed by the First
64
District Court of Appeals in Andres v. Village of Flossmoor. In Andres,
a case brought by neighboring property owners, a rezoning ordinance was
challenged as an invalid contract or conditional zoning because the rezoning
resolution contained eight restrictions and conditions on the property and
65
restricted its use to only one of the uses permitted for R-6 districts. One
of the conditions in the ordinance provided that:
The owner-developer must "enter into a contract within
90 days of the effective date of the Ordinance with the
Village of Flossmoor ... containing all of the restrictions
and conditions of this Ordinance, which Contract shall be
recorded and the provisions thereof shall be deemed
covenants running with the described property, and which
by its terms prohibita more extensive use of the property
contingent
and shall make the zoning granted hereunder
"66
upon strict compliance with said covenants.
67
According to the court, Treadway v. City of Rockford was controlling and required reversal of the trial court's judgment sustaining the validity
of the ordinance. According to the court, Treadway:

[c]onstitutes a succinct and perceptive analysis of the
reasons why, absent general statutory authorization and
standards, the making of individualized zoning deals by
local municipalities, apart from the provisions they are
willing to adopt as general zoning regulations, is an
invalid abuse of the zoning power.68
Nevertheless, the court found it necessary to invoke at length the contract
zoning mantra from the hoary cases cited in Hedrich.
Perhaps the most telling aspect of Andres is the substance of the
conditions to which the Andres court apparently took offense. Those

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 252.
304 N.E.2d 700 (II1.App. Ct. 1973).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
182 N.E.2d 219 (II. 1962).
304 N.E.2d at 703.
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conditions included a requirement that the developer pay $1,000 per building
which, according to the court, did not even "purport" to have any "conceivable lawful relationship to the zoning requirements of all R-6 zoned property
in Flossmoor, "69 and a provision that the property automatically revert to
another zoning classification in the event of a breach "without any of the
procedural steps or substantive considerations necessary thereto."70 These
conditions are, on their face, so obviously defective that they likely
influenced the court's view of the matter. Equally important, the court
found that there was a total absence of "any standard" by which a conditional zoning approval was to be based, a circumstance which would appear to
be a blatant violation of the well-established requirement
that the exercise
71
of discretion be fettered by discrete standards.
In Ziemer v. County of Peoria,72 a five-acre parcel of land was
rezoned from agriculture to permit the construction of a "dance halltavern."03 The site of the proposed tavern was land which "had been used
continuously for growing crops and was zoned agricultural at the time of
purchase. 7 4 "It is located in a sparsely populated rural area surrounded by
farm land. 7 5 The owner of an adjoining farm challenged the zoning as
unlawful conditional or contract zoning because the rezoning "[w]as
conditioned upon a restrictive covenant limiting use of the property to dance
hall-tavern. 76 After rehashing the holdings of the Treadway, Hedrich,
Cederberg, Andres, the intermediate appellate court in Goffinet, and the
advantages and disadvantages of conditional zoning as a "flexible zoning
tool," the court held:
Although we acknowledge that special circumstances of
overriding public necessity, such as existed in Goffinet,
may justify the use of conditional zoning in an exceptional case, we believe the general rule invalidating
conditional zoning is recognized in Illinois. Neither the
County of Peoria or Hanlon has urged any special circumstances to justify conditional zoning in this case, and the

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 705.

Id. at 705 (citing Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So. 2d 384, 388 (Miss. 1966)).
Andres, 304 N.E.2d at 705.
338 N.E.2d 145 (I11.App. Ct. 1975).

73. Id.

74. Id. at 146.
75. Id.

76. Id. According to the court's opinion, the dance hall-tavern was "proposed to
operate a country-music dance hall serving alcoholic beverages, with plans to accommodate
800-1000 people drawn from a 30-mile radius, including Galesburg and Peoria." Id.
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record does not disclose any facts showing that the public
health, safety and welfare were considered at the time the
zoning amendment was passed.77
In other words, conditional zoning in the absence of a comprehensive
plan was doomed to what one observer described as the "mockery of ad
hockery."' T That does not mean, or at least should not mean, that conditional zoning must always be suspect. Indeed, the obvious antidote is the
preparation and adoption of a comprehensive plan which establishes goals,
policies and objectives as a framework for individual decisions in regard to
a requested rezoning and imposition of conditions. And, given the
emergence of planning as the logical and legal predicate for zoning in the
late 1960s and 1970s, judicial antipathy towards conditional zoning should
79
have and did, even in Illinois, wane. Goffinet v. Christian County
involved a purchaser of land who "Wanted the property rezoned from
agricultural to heavy industrial and a special use permit issued so that they
could construct and operate a synthetic gas production plant on the
property. 0 The proposed zoning amendment conditioned the rezoning by
limiting the use of the land under the heavy industrial zoning to the
proposed gasification facility and by providing that upon removal of the
8
plant, the land would revert to an agricultural zoning classification. ' The
adjacent owners of agricultural land challenged the rezoning as conditional
or spot zoning. 82
The Goffinet court sustained the validity of the rezoning because the
court found that the conditions set forth in the zoning resolution satisfied the
a
test set forth in LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook." In LaSalle
National Bank, the court held that the rezoning did not constitute an abrupt
departure from the county's comprehensive plan which generally emphasized
industrial development for the future. 4 In addition, the LaSalle court held
that the rezoning did not contain "elements of contract" because the

77. Id. at 148. It would undoubtedly be entertaining to imagine what kind of special
public health, safety and welfare purpose could have been invoked in favor of the proposed
use. Cf.Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 410 N.E.2d 37 (Il.
1980).
78. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966).
79. 357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 1976).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 446.
82. Id. at 444.
83. 145 N.E.2d 65 (111. 1957).

84. Id.
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conditions were neither a surrender of governmental authority by the county
nor an attempt to improperly control the use of land. 5
The Goffinet court also held that where the conditions set forth in an
ordinance are not met, the authority granted by the ordinance is thereby
terminated.8 6 In relying on a reversionary clause in the rezoning ordinance,
the court concluded that if the conditions are not honored, the special use
and the conditional zoning would discontinue and the prior zoning
classification would be reimposed. s7
Interestingly, Goffinet has also been relied upon where the rezoning
amendment did not contain a specific reverter clause. In American National
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Village of Arlington Heights,"8 the same
court which decided Andres, 9 held that even in the absence of reversionary
language, Goffinet stood for the proposition that upon the failure of specific
conditions set forth in a rezoning ordinance's conditions, the zoning
reclassification failed as well.
In Goffinet, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that some of the
earlier Illinois cases had invalidated conditional zoning. 90 The court
specifically addressed Treadway and noted that its dicta, as well as the
holdings of those cases finding conditional rezoning invalid, are not to be
accepted as meaning that conditional rezoning is necessarily illegal, (i.e.,
"invalid per se"), but that the focus must be on the application of the
traditional zoning standards set forth in LaSalle.
As it turns out then, the starting point for understanding the case law
governing conditional zoning, as it is with any other substantive zoning
issue, is the Illinois Supreme Court's landmark decision of LaSalle National
Bank v. County of Cook.9' In LaSalle, the court defined the test for the
validity of a zoning ordinance as a balancing of several competing
circumstances and interests. 92 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that

85. Id.

86. Goffinet, 357 N.E.2d at 448.

87. Id.
88. 450 N.E.2d 898 (I1. App. Ct. 1983).
89. There is much that can be said to distinguish Andres. However, it would serve no
purpose because the very issues addressed in Andres, including the court's apostolic view of
Treadway, was explicitly rejected or distinguished three years later by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Goffinet v. Christian County, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976). "The Andres case was clearly
a demonstration of improper conditional zoning. The conditions placed in the rezoning
ordinance introduce elements of contract, which have no place in the legislative process, and
showed an abuse of zoning authority." Id. at 447.
90. 357 N.E.2d 442 (111. 1976).
91. 145 N.E.2d 65 (III. 1957).
92. Id. at 69.
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whether an ordinance will be held invalid is determined by an evaluation of
the following six factors, not one of which factor is controlling:
(1) the existing uses and zoning of nearby property;
(2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the
particular zoning restrictions;
(3) the extent to which the destruction of property values of
plaintiff promotes health, safety, morals or general welfare of
the public;
(4) the relative gain to the public as compared to the hardship
imposed upon the individual property owner;
(5) the suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes;
and
(6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned
in the area in
considered in the context of land development
93
the vicinity of the subject property.
Since Goffinet, there have been several cases where conditional zoning
has been addressed. In People v. City of Batavia,94 the court held that the
city did not have the authority to enter into a restrictive covenant that
affected the zoning of property outside its borders.95
In Nolan v. City of Taylorville," neighboring property owners
challenged the rezoning of a tract of land from single family to multifamily
and the issuance of a special use permit which permitted the construction of
a 134 unit, high rise apartment building for the elderly and the handicapped.97 The rezoning ordinances required the owners and developer to
widen a street, extend sidewalks beyond the end of the property, add a loop
to the water system, and improve storm and sanitary sewer facilities for the
area.98 In considering the validity of the city's action, the court considered
the rezoning and special use as a "unit."99 The court commenced its
analysis with a brief homily to Goffinet:
Conditional zoning ordinances, however, are suspect and
subject to special scrutiny. Courts have been concerned
that municipalities not surrender their governmental
authority to determine sound land use, or improperly try
93. IU

94.
95.
96.
97.

414 N.E.2d 916 (Iii. App. Ct. 1980).
Id. at 920.
420 N.E.2d 1037 (III. App. Ct. 1981).
Id. at 1039-40.

98. Id.

99. Id. at 1039.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

to control the use of land. Conditional zoning can also
furnish an avenue for corruption of officials. But conditional rezoning is not invalid per se in Illinois. The
conditions in the rezoning ordinance in the Goffinet case
were general and related to satisfying existing statutes and
regulation of environmental protective agencies. The
court in Goffinet distinguished those conditions from the
very specific ones in Andres v. Village of Flossmoor."
The court then paid itself a compliment by quoting from its own
opinion in Goffinet which had been affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court:
"[s]ome conditional zoning may be in the public good, subservient to a
comprehensive plan, in the best interest of the public health, safety and
welfare and enacted in recognition of changed circumstances." 1° ,
Interestingly, the Nolan court held that a rezoning amendment will be
examined with heightened care or "special scrutiny":
Zoning ordinances are presumptively valid and the
presumption may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
Conditional zoning ordinances, however, are suspect and
subject to special scrutiny. Courts have been concerned
that municipalities not surrender their governmental
authority to determine sound land use, or improperly try
to control the use of land. Conditional zoning can also
furnish an avenue for corruption of officials. But conditional rezoning is not invalid per se in Illinois. 2
The court shifted the burden of proof to the municipality and found that
the proposed rezoning was invalid because it did not satisfy the LaSalle test
and because the rezoning ordinances were not substantially related to the
welfare of the community as a whole.
Nolan also explained why the particular facts in Nolan were distinguishable from those in Goffinet where the rezoning indicated no detriment
to surrounding landowners, no decrease in property values, and no danger
to the public health or safety, and where there was an unquestionable public
benefit to the entire region by the granting of the special use with conditions
attached. Moreover, the Nolan court observed that Goffinet involved
property which was uniquely suited for a particular use which was proposed.

100. 420 N.E.2d at 1039-40 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 1040.
102. Id. at 1039-40.
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In contrast, the evidence in Nolan demonstrated that there was no shortage
of property which was already zoned R-2 (the requested rezoning category)
and suitable for the proposed development. The court noted in particular
that there were four properties which met the developer's criteria which
were not totally surrounded by single family single story structures as was
the subject property. Likewise the court found that the rezoning involved
admitted detriments to surrounding homeowners and residents of the
neighborhood.
In American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Village of
Arlington Heights,'°3 the Village of Arlington Heights had granted a
rezoning from residential to a commercial classification qualified by a
number of conditions including a requirement that construction commence
within one year." When the developer failed to commence construction
within one year, the village took the position that the property was no longer
zoned for commercial use when a successor developer sought to develop
under the commercial classification.'0 5 The developer filed suit alleging
that the rezoning itself (set out in one of four sections in the rezoning
ordinance) was severable and did not revert to residential zoning upon the
failure to commence construction within one year."° As indicated above,
not only did the court have no difficulty with enforcing the provisions of
what was clearly conditional zoning, the court looked to Goffinet for
direction in regard to the issue of severability in what can only be described
as an expansive reading of Goffinet:'0 7
In Goffinet . . .the Illinois Supreme Court found that
conditional zoning is permissable and that where the
conditions set forth in an ordinance are not met, the
authority granted by the ordinance is thereby terminated.
The court concluded that when the conditions are not
honored in such a case, the special use and the conditional
zoning terminate and the prior zoning classification is
reimposed. Although the ordinance in the Goffinet case
contained a specific reverter clause addressing the zoning

App. Ct. 1983).
103. 450 N.E.2d 898 (111.
104. Id. at 900.
105. Id. at 901.
106. Id.
107. In regard to the continuing vitality of Andres, it may be noteworthy that the
appellate court which decided Andres was the same division and district which decided
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Village of Arlington Heights, 450 N.E.2d
898 (II1.App. Ct. 1983).
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matter, we believe that the court's reasoning is particularly
pertinent to the case at bar. 3
In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. County of Cook," 9 a municipality
challenged a county zoning resolution on the grounds that the county agreed
to the rezoning of property in return for the property owner's promise to
abide by certain restrictions and conditions in regard to the development of
the property which were incorporated in a special use approval which was
granted simultaneously with the rezoning." 0 Without citation to any
authority, the court rejected the complaining municipality's challenge:
The Village next contends that the rezoning and
special use constitutes -illegal contract and spot zoning.
The Village asserts that the County has agreed to the
rezoning of the property in return for the property owner's
promise to abide by certain restrictions on development of
the property. The rezoning and special use restricts the use
of the property in a manner not consistent with general C4 commercial zoning. The Village concludes that illegal
contract zoning is clearly shown by these facts ....
We
find nothing in the record to support the Village's contention that a deal was illegally struck between the County
and the property owner before the property was rezoned.
Secondly, the County zoning ordinance clearly permits
special uses such as the one which the Village asserts as
probative of illegal contract zoning."'
The court then went on to make it clear that challenges to conditional
zoning are no different from other challenges and that under Illinois,
conditional zoning ordinances are presumed valid:
We believe the record amply supports the trial
court's finding that the rezoning and special use did not
constitute illegal contract or spot zoning. We find that the
trial court was correct in finding that the rezoning and
108. 450 N.E.2d at 902.
109. 457 N.E.2d 1326, 1332 (III. App. Ct. 1983).
110. Id.
111. Chicago Title, 457 N.E.2d at 1334-35. The notion that the taint traditionally
associated with conditional zoning can be removed by the simple artifice of simultaneous
issuance of a special use permit represents should make it clear to any doubter that
conditional zoning is now valid in the State of Illinois. Moreover, the Nolan decision also
involved a simultaneously issued special use permit which did not save the rezoning against
a conditional zoning challenge.
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special use was amply supported by the record. Further,
the burden of proof was upon the Village [the challenger]
to establish that the rezoning and special use was arbitrary, unreasonable and not related to public, health and
welfare. The Village did not meet its burden.... We
adhere to the principle that where there is room for
legitimate difference of opinion concerning the reasonableness of the classification effected by an ordinance, or
amendment thereto, the courts will not interefere with the
legislative judgment.12
It is difficult to reconcile the Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. County of
Cook view of the standard of review with the Nolan court's view that
conditional zoning ordinances are "suspect and subject to special scrutiny"
except by pointing out that the two cases were decided by two different
districts of the Illinois Appellate Courts.
CONCLUSION

In the context of the history of zoning and planning, the Illinois case
law which is hostile to conditional zoning has little or no contemporary
vitality. The fundamental and well-taken grounds for judicial skepticism of
conditional zoning has been overtaken by the emergence of planning. It is
no coincidence that Goffinet," a the leading Illinois case on conditional
zoning, is also the leading case on the importance of comprehensive
planning as a predicate for zoning.
The reality is that the built environment is a far more complex system
than the simplistic, exclusive zones which were the staples of Euclidean
zoning. Contemporary planning initiatives, variously styled as "new
communities" and "neo-traditional town planning," and now "new urbanism," reject theories of uniformity and segregation and embrace diversity
and integration as fundamental to "communities of place.""1 4 Conditional
zoning can be an effective and flexible means of tailoring decisions are
made in the context of a well-conceived, up-to-date comprehensive plan.
The bottom line is that the current case law in Illinois stands for the
proposition that "conditional zoning is not invalid per se."'' 5 Although
this language taken from Goffinet is not a ringing endorsement of condition112. Id. at 1335.
113. 357 N.E.2d 442 (Il. 1976).
114. The concept of communities of place is described in the New Jersey State
Development and Redevelopment Plan.
115. Goffinet v. Christian County, 357 N.E.2d 442, 448 (111.1976).
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al zoning, if conditions are imposed under the framework of a comprehensive plan and can be shown to be directed at achieving the goals, policies
and objectives of the plan, they are more likely than not to be upheld.
On the other hand, where zoning involves a bilateral agreement that
either expressly or impliedly commits the zoning authority to a legally
binding promise, it is likely to be invalid. Rathkopf' s defines contract
zoning to be "the process of imposing, by private agreement, land use
restrictions upon a parcel which are extrinsic to the zoning amendment and
which are imposed in conjunction with the passage of the amendment." 116
The difference between contract zoning which is illegal and conditional
zoning which is not is that in contract zoning, there is a bilateral agreement
committing the zoning authority to a legally binding promise. By contrast,
in conditional zoning, the zoning authority is not legally bound to rezone.
Beyond Illinois, courts across the country that have approved conditional zoning view it as a flexible planning tool that permits a local government
to balance developmental demands against fiscal and environmental
concerns. Generally, the "modern trend" according to Rathkopf s and others
is for courts to uphold conditional rezoning so long as: (1) the rezoning
promotes the general welfare and not merely private interests; (2) the
rezoning does not otherwise constitute illegal spot zoning; (3) the conditions
imposed are reasonable and not otherwise illegal; and (4) there is no express
agreement bargaining away the local government's future use of the police
power." 7
The Illinois Supreme Court stated in Goffinet that rezoning conditions
should be related to the rezoning, and thus to the public welfare." 8 Where
conditions are designed to actually benefit the surrounding properties as well
as significantly advance the community welfare, this should satisfy the
Goffinet standard.

116. See ZIEGLER, supra note 23, at § 57.05.
117. Id. at § 29A.03.
118. Goffinet, 357 N.E.2d 442, 447 (II. 1976).

